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Implicit discount rates (IDRs) are employed in energy models to capture household investment decisions,
yet the factors behind the IDR and their respective implications for policy-making usually remain blurred
and fractional. The proposed comprehensive framework distinguishes three broad categories of factors
underlying the IDR for household adoption of energy-efﬁcient technologies (EETs): preferences (notably
over time, risk, loss, debt, and the environment), predictable (ir)rational behavior (bounded rationality,
rational inattention, behavioral biases), and external barriers to energy efﬁciency. Existing empirical
ﬁndings suggest that the factors underlying the IDRs that differ across household characteristics and
technologies should be accounted for in energy models. Furthermore, the framework allows for a fresh
look at the interplay of IDRs and policies. We argue that a simple observation of high IDRs (or observing
correlations between IDRs and socio-economic characteristics) does not provide guidance for policy-
making since the underlying sources cannot be identiﬁed. Instead, we propose that some of the factors
underlying the IDR - notably external barriers - can be changed (through directed policy interventions)
whereas other factors - notably preferences and predictable (ir)rational behavior - are innate and can
only be taken into account (through reactive policy interventions).
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Discount rates play a crucial role in model-based policy eva-
luations such as energy-efﬁciency policy assessments. Con-
ceptually, two types of discount rates may be distinguished. First,r Ltd. This is an open access article
ent & Technology, Grenoble
renoble, France.
(J. Schleich).social discount rates, which essentially compare costs and beneﬁts
that accrue at different points in time, typically reﬂect pure time
preferences and decreasing marginal utility of consumption or the
government's opportunity costs of capital (e.g. the long term re-
turn on government bonds) (e.g. Arrow et al., 1996). Second, so-
called subjective discount rates govern decision makers’ actual
adoption behavior. For parameterization of the subjective discount
rates, models typically rely on implicit discount rates (IDRs). An
IDR is estimated from observed technology adoption choices andunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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observed technology choice reasonable (Dubin and McFadden,
1984).1
Starting with the seminal work by Dubin and McFadden (1984),
Hausman (1979), and Train (1985), the empirical literature on
household energy technology adoption decisions has found IDRs
to typically exceed the opportunity costs of capital. Unlike social
discount rates, IDRs also reﬂect external “barriers to energy efﬁ-
ciency” such as imperfect information, capital constraints or the
landlord-tenant (split-incentive) problem. As recognized by Jaffe
and Stavins (1994), high IDRs are more of a restatement than the
source of the so-called “energy-efﬁciency paradox”, which postu-
lates that decision makers may fail to invest in energy-efﬁcient
technologies (EETs) even though these appear to pay off under
prevailing market conditions.2 In any event, since IDRs are derived
from EET adoption behavior (i.e. IDRs are estimated to be higher
when EET adoption is lower), there is a direct link between em-
pirical results obtained about EET adoption and IDR estimates used
in models.
Clearly, the two types of discount rates serve very different
purposes; yet this distinction is often not made in actual model-
based policy assessments. This problem has been recently noted
by Hermelink and Jager (2015) and Steinbach et al. (2015), among
others, within the discussion of the energy efﬁciency target in EU's
2030 energy and climate policy framework and the corresponding
impact assessment (European Commission, 2014).3 While there is
an extensive body of literature discussing the social discount rate
(e.g. Stern, 2006; Nordhaus, 2007), the factors behind the implicit
discount rate and their respective implications for policy making
usually remain blurred and fractional. In this paper, we aim to
contribute to closing this gap. We present a comprehensive fra-
mework of the underlying factors of the IDR for household
adoption of EET, relying in particular on insights from the beha-
vioral economics literature. More speciﬁcally, our framework dis-
tinguishes three broad categories of factors underlying the IDR:
(i) preferences such as time preferences, risk preferences, re-
ference-dependent preferences and pro-environmental pre-
ferences; (ii) predictable (ir)rational behavior, i.e. bounded ra-
tionality, rational inattention, and behavioral biases, such as pre-
sent bias or status quo bias; and (iii) external barriers to energy
efﬁciency such as split incentives, lack of information or lack of
capital (e.g. Sorrell et al., 2004).
After describing these underlying factors, we illustrate through
selected examples the effects of covariates such as household and
technology characteristics on the IDR at the factor level. By com-
bining established concepts from various disciplines, our frame-
work organizes notions around the IDR in a novel way, provides
insights into the interplay of IDRs and policy interventions, and
offers guidance for improved energy modeling and policy assess-
ment. While all policies aim at lowering the IDR, this framework
distinguishes between directed and reactive policies. Directed
policies aim at directly lowering the external barriers (e.g.1 To illustrate, suppose an energy efﬁcient technology has upfront costs of 120
Euros and annual operating costs of 20 Euros. Yet the consumer decides to purchase
an alternative technology with upfront costs of 100 Euros, and annual operating
costs of 50 Euros. For simplicity, assume the lifetime of either technology is one
year. In this case, the implicit discount rate which explains the adoption of the
alternative technology would be 0.5¼(5020)/(120100)1.
2 Note that the “energy-efﬁciency paradox” differs from the “energy efﬁciency
gap” (e.g. Gerarden et al., 2015b). The “energy efﬁciency paradox” refers to the
notion that some energy-efﬁciency technologies that would be proﬁtable for
adopters are nevertheless not adopted. In comparison, the “energy-efﬁciency gap”
means that adoption is lower than socially optimal, e.g. because energy prices do
not adequately reﬂect environmental externalities.
3 Since they are substantially higher than social discount rates, applying IDR
rather than social discount rates typically leads to less ambitious energy efﬁciency
targets.mandatory building certiﬁcates addressing split-incentives). Re-
active policies take into account the factors underlying the IDR
that cannot be changed such as preferences (e.g. offer loans with
ﬁxed interest rates to risk-averse household with a high time
discount rate).
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents our framework for categorizing the factors underlying
the IDR in a comprehensive manner. This section also documents
the ﬁndings from the literature on the correlation of these
factors with selected household and technology characteristics.
Based on this framework, Section 3 explores the interplay of
policy interventions and the IDR. The concluding Section 4
summarizes the main ﬁndings, points to future research, and
highlights the contributions of the paper for conceptual under-
pinning of the IDR, policy making, and modeling household
adoption of EETs.2. Framework
Studies that empirically estimate the IDR for the adoption of
EETs, based on observed behavior in private households (e.g. Train,
1985 for an early review), ﬁnd that the IDRs vary substantially
across technologies, but also within similar technology classes. For
example, the IDRs for refrigerators range from 34% (Hausman,
1979) to 300% (Meier and Whittier, 1983). Similarly, for an oil-
based heating system, IDRs are estimated to be as low as 14%
(Corum and O’Neal, 1982) and as high as 127% (Ruderman et al.,
1987). Clearly, these ﬁgures are higher than the costs of capital, i.e.,
the rates at which households can borrow money.4 The previous
empirical literature (e.g. Train, 1985) and modelers (e.g. ICCS,
2014./ICCS PRIMES, 2014) casually note that certain factors, such as
barriers to energy efﬁciency, help explain this difference. The more
conceptual literature focuses on factors explaining the “energy
efﬁciency paradox”, thus highlighting external barriers to energy
efﬁciency (e.g. Brown, 2001; Sathaye et al., 2001; Sorrell et al.,
2004), emphasizing the distinction between market failures and
external barriers (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994), or concentrating on
behavioral factors (Gillingham et al., 2009; Gillingham and Palmer,
2014). Since the objective of this conceptual literature was not to
explain the IDR, it only offered a partial picture, and typically
neglected the role of consumer preferences. Consequently, a
comprehensive framework of the factors underlying the IDR and
their implications for modeling and policy interventions has not
yet been presented.
Fig. 1 provides a graphical representation of our proposed fra-
mework for looking inside the IDR, which includes as overarching
factor categories (i) preferences, (ii) predictable (ir)rational beha-
vior, and (iii) external barriers to energy efﬁciency.5 These will be
discussed in more detail below.
2.1. Preferences
The ﬁrst category of factors in our IDR framework reﬂects in-
dividual preferences, which are assumed to govern individual
choice between alternatives. In particular, we focus on preferences4 More recent studies eliciting IDRs tend to rely on stated (rather than ob-
served) behavior, thus limiting the comparability of ﬁndings. Yet those studies also
ﬁnd IDRs to vary substantially and to exceed market interest rates (e.g. Min et al.,
2014; Newell and Siikamäki, 2015; Revelt and Train, 1998).
5 Ceteris paribus, the total size of the IDR depends on the difference in upfront
investment costs between the adoption of an EET and an alternative technology, on
the difference in operating costs, and on how these are distributed over time. But
these differences do not explain the energy efﬁciency paradox and are neglected in
the subsequent discussion.
Fig. 1. : Factors underlying the implicit discount rate.
6 Technically, ambiguity differs from risk by the absence of objective prob-
abilities. It is a more general concept that includes risk as a special case.
7 More formally, risk aversion refers to the second derivative of the utility
function, while prudence refers to the third derivative of the utility function. Pru-
dence is also a necessary condition for decreasing absolute risk aversion, a com-
monly accepted assumption in behavioral economics.
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pendent preferences.
2.1.1. Time preferences
Time preferences reﬂect how individuals valuate the future
relative to the present. The rate at which individuals discount the
future is what economists generally understand as the “discount
rate” when modeling investment behavior. In these models, time
preferences are typically captured by an exponential discount
function, with a single parameter describing the discount rate.
Since the adoption of EET usually includes an investment followed
by dispersed gains in the future, an individual's decision to invest
in EET should depend on individual time preferences. While the
relationship between discount rates and behavior has been ex-
plored in the literature for different domains (e.g. Nyhus and
Webley, 2006), few studies analyze EET adoption. In particular,
Newell and Siikamäki (2015) link individual differences in time
preferences to investment in EET and ﬁnd that more patient
households are also more likely to adopt energy-efﬁcient waterheaters. However, for a variety of other energy-saving measures,
Bradford et al. (2014) and Bruderer Enzler et al. (2014) do not ﬁnd
consistent effects of time discounting.
2.1.2. Risk preferences
Risk preferences may affect the adoption of EET, because the
decision entails various aspects of uncertainty. Since the proﬁt-
ability of EETs hinges on several uncertain factors, such as future
energy prices, technology performance (and reliability), or reg-
ulation (e.g. tax rates, CO2-prices), risk has long been thought to
impede EET adoption (Hirst and Brown, 1990; Shama, 1983). Thus,
greater risk aversion results in higher IDRs, ceteris paribus. Risk
preferences have frequently been found to affect the adoption of
new technologies in other contexts (e.g. Liu, 2013; Tsur et al.,
1990). The scant empirical literature on risk and EET adoption also
suggests that more risk-averse households are less likely to adopt
energy-efﬁcient ventilation and insulation systems (Farsi, 2010)
and light bulbs (Qiu et al., 2014).
2.1.2.1. Ambiguity. In situations involving risk, a decision maker is
able to attach objective probabilities to all possible events. Yet, real
life decisions rarely entail objective probabilities, especially when
they involve unfamiliar choices. Thus, preferences over ambiguity
may better reﬂect individuals’ adoption of novel EETs in particular,
such as LEDs or modern ventilation systems.6 The stronger the
preferences to avoid ambiguity are, the higher the IDR. For in-
vestment decisions in other domains, including farming (Bough-
erara et al., 2012), ambiguity preferences have been found to be
relevant and to differ from pure risk preferences. However, to the
best of our knowledge, ambiguity preferences have not yet been
empirically explored for EET adoption.
2.1.2.2. Prudence. Risk aversion reﬂects individuals' preferences on
variance of outcome; prudence describes the preferences on
skewness of outcome and is a key concept when analyzing beha-
vior under risk.7 The concept is best explained with an example.
Imagine a household has to choose between two retroﬁt measures,
A and B. The total lifetime beneﬁt of these measures depends on
initial investment costs and energy cost savings over time; the
energy cost savings depend on future fuel costs, which are un-
certain. Suppose that Retroﬁt Measure A has higher initial in-
vestment costs than B, but higher energy costs savings over time.
A has lifetime beneﬁts of 0€ with a probability of ¼ and of 2000€
with the probability of ¾; B has lifetime beneﬁts of 1000€ with a
probability of ¾ and of 3000€ with a probability of ¼. These two
retroﬁt measures have the same mean and variance, but B is more
skewed to the right, while A is more skewed to the left. Even
though A may seem “riskier” (it is said to have more “downside
risk”), pure risk aversion cannot explain a preference of B over A.
The preference for B is described by prudence, or an aversion to
downside risk. Prudence has been shown to explain individuals’
decisions in laboratory experiments quite well (Ebert and Wiesen,
2014) but has not yet been considered in an EET adoption context.
2.1.3. Reference-dependent preferences
Individuals typically do not evaluate beneﬁts associated with
outcomes of choice in absolute terms, but relative to reference
points. A prime example is loss aversion, i.e., the notion that losses
relative to a reference point are evaluated more strongly than
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sion was ﬁrst proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in the
framework of prospect theory. Loss aversion helps resolve the
criticism of expected utility put forward by Rabin and Thaler
(2001) and Rabin (2000) who show that reasonable degrees of risk
aversion for small and moderate investments (stakes) imply un-
reasonably high degrees of risk aversion for large stakes. Loss
aversion is relevant to the adoption of EET if the (additional) costs
of investing in EET are evaluated as a loss. In this case, individuals
may refrain from engaging in otherwise proﬁtable investment
projects because they over-weight the losses associated with
them. Thus, loss aversion is likely to increase the IDR, but has not
yet been explored empirically in the context of EET adoption.
Other forms of reference-dependent preference may also affect
decisions to invest in EET. For example, individuals may evaluate
their own decisions relative to others, and be more willing to
adopt EET if their reference group (e.g. neighbors or colleagues)
decides to adopt (“keeping up with the Joneses”). Such social
preferences have been shown to cause signiﬁcant reductions in
electricity and natural gas consumption (see for instance Allcott,
2011; Ayres et al., 2012; Nolan et al., 2008; Schultz et al., 2007).
2.1.4. Pro-environmental preferences
Lower energy use typically leads to lower resource use and
lower emissions of local and global pollutants, in particular of the
greenhouse gas CO2. Thus, EET adoption may also be driven by
pro-environmental preferences (or attitudes). While conventional
economic theory predicts that individuals have virtually no in-
centive to voluntarily contribute to the provision of public goods
like climate protection (e.g. Holländer, 1990), there is substantial
evidence that individuals do contribute to environmental
protection.8 Frey and Stutzer (2008) distinguish four motives to
explain this.9 First, individuals may exhibit pro-social preferences
(altruism). Second, individuals may follow social norms for pro
environmental behavior, thus avoiding social disapproval (Cialdini,
2007; Goldstein et al., 2008). Third, individuals may follow inter-
nalized individual norms, thus avoiding negative self-evaluations
such as feelings of guilt or lower self-respect (Black et al., 1985).
Finally, because of intrinsic motivation such as “warm glow” (An-
dreoni, 1989), individuals may get inherent satisfaction of the ac-
tivity itself. Both internalized individual norms and intrinsic mo-
tivation are derived from individual values. In practical applica-
tions it is difﬁcult to disentangle the relevance of the separate
motives which tend to vary by context and individual. Most em-
pirical studies exploring the impact of pro-environmental pre-
ferences on EET adoption rely on (stated) environmental attitudes.
Environmental attitudes have been found to be positively corre-
lated with the adoption of inexpensive measures like light bulbs
(Di Maria et al., 2010; Mills and Schleich, 2014), but appear less
relevant for predicting more expensive investments like thermal
retroﬁt (e.g. Ramos et al., 2015; Whitmarsh and O’Neill, 2010), thus
suggesting a trade-off between ﬁnancial and environmental con-
cerns. In a similar way, the so-called “low-cost hypothesis” from
the social science literature argues that individuals prefer to satisfy
their environmental conscience with low-cost measures, which
may in actuality have little effect on the environment (Diekmann
and Preisendörfer, 1998, 2003; or Whitmarsh, 2009).8 Adoption of EET constitutes an impure public good, reﬂecting properties of a
private good (providing energy services) and a public good (e.g. lowering green-
house gas emissions).
9 See Wilson and Dowlatabadi (2007) for an overview of different social sci-
ence concepts including conventional and behavioral economics, psychology and
sociology.2.1.5. Summary on the role of preferences
To summarize, impatience, risk aversion, ambiguity, loss aver-
sion, and prudence all increase the IDR, while pro-environmental
preferences lower the IDR. If pro-environmental preferences are
sufﬁciently strong, they may even render the IDR negative.
Of course, preferences are more comprehensive and may also
include other factors than those considered. For example, debt
aversion is expected to be a particularly relevant concept in the
context of EET adoption. Debt aversion refers to the idea that
people may intrinsically dislike being in debt, and thus forgo
otherwise proﬁtable investment projects, if they need to be ﬁ-
nanced with credit. Debt aversion has recently been found to affect
individuals’ decisions to pursue a higher education degree (Eckel
et al., 2007; Field, 2009) and life-cycle consumption and saving
decisions (Fenig et al., 2013; Meissner, 2016). Since the ﬁnancing of
capital-intensive investments in EET (such as thermal insulation or
a new heating system) may require households to rely on credit,
debt aversion may inhibit the adoption of EET (even in the absence
of credit market failures). Thus, debt aversion would lead to a
higher IDR, but has not been explored in the context of EET
adoption.
In any case, conventional economics assumes that individuals
make rational choices based on their preferences. This assumption
will be challenged by the factors underlying the IDR considered
next.
2.2. Predictable (ir)rational behavior
The second category of factors in our IDR framework comprises
of bounded rationality, rational inattention and behavioral biases,
and may lead to systematic deviations from rationality when
making investment decisions, and thus impact observed implicit
discount rates.
2.2.1. Bounded rationality
Because of cognitive limits, individuals are constrained in their
ability to compute, process, and evaluate information. Bounded
rationality is the notion that individuals behave optimally given
these constraints. Thus, bounded rationality may lead to sub-op-
timal technology choices even if individuals have all of the avail-
able information (Simon, 1959; Stern, 1986). Instead of processing
this information thoroughly, individuals rely on rules of thumb
(heuristics) that facilitate decision making. For example, house-
holds may just consider the purchasing price rather than total
lifetime costs when choosing a new appliance. While in principle,
bounded rationality may increase or decrease the IDR, the em-
pirical literature suggests that bounded rationality mostly impedes
the adoption of EETs, i.e. increases the IDR (Gerarden et al., 2015a;
Gillingham and Palmer, 2014).
2.2.2. Rational inattention
Closely related to the concept of bounded rationality is rational
inattention. For example, consider the decision to buy a light bulb
for a room that is rarely used. Calculating the costs and beneﬁts for
this simple decision is extremely cumbersome, involving esti-
mating the remaining lifetime of the old light bulb, usage, the
development of electricity prices, etc. Due to the relatively low
cost of a light bulb, it might not be worthwhile to actually conduct
such a cost beneﬁt analysis (because of the opportunity costs of
time and effort). As a consequence, individuals may rationally
decide to only update their information irregularly (Allcott, 2013;
Reis, 2006). Sallee (2014) argues that inattention to energy efﬁ-
ciency may indeed be rational in the market for home appliances
and automobiles. Depending on which information is not paid
attention to, rational inattention may affect IDRs positively or
negatively; extant research suggest however that it generally leads
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tinguish from bounded rationality but we keep them separate
because they have different policy implications.
2.2.3. Behavioral biases
Based on concepts from psychology and behavioral economics,
a (non-exhaustive) set of anomalies of individual behavior can be
identiﬁed, which an emerging literature has started to analyze in
the energy efﬁciency domain (e.g. Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010;
Allcott, 2011).10 Generally, any behavioral anomaly can be due to
non-standard preferences or due to behavioral biases. In the fol-
lowing, we classify a behavioral anomaly as a bias (as opposed to
preference), if choice is affected unconsciously by it, if individuals
who are conscious of a bias would want to change their behavior,
or if welfare can be improved by accounting for and reacting to a
particular bias.11
2.2.3.1. Status quo bias. Status quo bias refers to the empirical
observation that individuals tend to stick with the status quo even
if changing behavior would be preferable. Most prominently, in-
dividuals adhere to (externally set) defaults. As evidenced by
Madrian and Shea (2001) participation in retirement plans in-
creases dramatically if the default is set to participation. Likewise,
Abadie and Gay (2006) ﬁnd that organ donorship is higher in
countries where donating is the default compared to countries
where donating is not the default. Thus, the status quo bias tends
to increase the IDR. The few applications in the context of energy
efﬁciency include Brown et al. (2013), who ﬁnd that setting de-
faults for thermostats (slightly) lowers the average temperature in
an OECD ofﬁce building.
2.2.3.2. Present bias. A vast body of literature in experimental
psychology and experimental economics, including Laibson
(1997), Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), and Thaler (1991), has
documented that individuals tend to systematically overvalue the
present compared to the future by an amount that cannot con-
sistently be explained with exponential discounting (typically as-
sumed in classical economic theory). This present bias is typically
modeled with a (quasi) hyperbolic, rather than an exponential
discounting function (Ainslie, 1974; Laibson, 1997). As an illus-
trative example of present bias, consider the choice between €100
today and €150 a year from today. Many people will prefer the
€100 today, but when facing the choice between €100 in four years
and €150 in ﬁve years, almost everyone will prefer €150 in ﬁve
years. In effect, present-biased individuals behave time incon-
sistently. For example, they plan to quit smoking, or to start a diet,
but continuously defer acting upon, even when recognizing that
this would be beneﬁcial. Clearly, a present bias would lead to a
higher IDR. Only few studies have explored the effects of present
bias in the context of EET. For automobile purchases, Allcott and
Wozny (2014) ﬁnd evidence for a small present bias, while Busse
et al. (2013) conclude that there is no present bias. The results of
Cohen et al. (2015) suggest that present bias moderately impedes
the adoption of energy-efﬁcient refrigerators.
2.2.3.3. Probability distortion. Individuals have been found to dis-
tort objective probabilities in their subjective probability assess-
ment (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). More speciﬁcally, they tend
to over-weight small probabilities and to under-weight high
probabilities of events. While probability distortion may explain10 See also Ramos et al. (2015) for a collection of behavioral biases.
11 If a certain behavioral “anomaly” is due to preferences, then trying to
counteract this anomaly will generally not be welfare improving. For example, if a
debt-averse person is forced to take on a loan to invest in EET, this person’s welfare
will not be higher compared to the situation without intervention.real life decisions like buying lottery tickets, its relevance has not
been explored in the context of EET adoption. For example, the IDR
would be higher if individuals over-weighted the probability of
technology failure for EET or under-weighted the probability of
energy cost savings. Probability distortion which has been found to
impede the adoption of new technologies in other domains (e.g.
Liu, 2013) has not yet been explored in the context of EET
adoption.
2.3. External barriers to energy efﬁciency
While preferences and predictable (ir)rational behaviors may
be classiﬁed as internal barriers to energy efﬁciency, the third
category of factors underlying the IDR in our framework captures
barriers which are external to the decision maker and depend on
institutional settings. According to Sorrell et al. (2004), barriers to
energy efﬁciency may be deﬁned as mechanisms inhibiting the
adoption of proﬁtable EET (Sorrell et al., 2004). Over the last two
decades, an extensive literature has explored barriers to energy
efﬁciency and produced different taxonomies, typically developed
from various (partially overlapping) disciplinary concepts (Ger-
arden et al., 2015b; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Jaffe and Stavins,
1994; Sorrell et al., 2004; Brown, 2001; or Sathaye et al., 2001).
Evidently, barriers to energy efﬁciency increase the IDR. We only
brieﬂy document the main barrier types and related empirical
ﬁndings, since these are rather well-known to the literature, and
are organized in similar taxonomies (e.g. Brown, 2001; Sathaye
et al., 2001; Sorrell et al., 2004).
2.3.1. Split incentives
Because of split incentives, investments in proﬁtable EETs are
likely to be foregone if actors cannot appropriate the beneﬁts of
the investment, as in the landlord-tenant problem. Since the
landlord pays for insulation, but the tenant beneﬁts from a smaller
energy bill, the landlord has no ﬁnancial incentive to invest in
insulation, unless the landlord can pass on the extra costs through
the rent. Empirical ﬁndings conﬁrm that owner-occupied homes
are more likely to adopt insulation measures (e.g. Ameli and
Brandt, 2015; Gillingham et al., 2012; Krishnamurthy and Kris-
tröm, 2015; Scott, 1997) and energy-efﬁcient appliances (Ameli
and Brandt, 2015; Davis, 2011; Krishnamurthy and Kriström, 2015;
Mills and Schleich, 2010a), but not energy-efﬁcient light bulbs
(Mills and Schleich, 2014, 2010b).
2.3.2. Lack of information and transaction costs
Lack of information about EET and cost-savings potential has
also been found to inhibit adoption (Palmer et al., 2012). Similarly,
transaction costs for gathering and analyzing information about
EET, energy consumption, or proﬁtability may be a barrier. For
thermal insulation measures, these may include costs for installing
sub-metering devices.
2.3.3. Technological and ﬁnancial risks
If households cannot get access to credit or can only borrow
money at high costs (e.g., because they cannot provide collateral,
or because of credit market failures), lack of capital may become a
barrier to the adoption of EET with high upfront costs. In Section
2.1.2, we already highlighted the implications of technological and
ﬁnancial risks for the IDR. Barriers may also interact with factors
from other categories: the ﬁnancial risk barrier will be more re-
levant for decision makers with higher risk aversion than for de-
cision makers with lower risk aversion. In addition, individual
factors underlying the IDR may be correlated. For example, more
risk-averse individuals have been found to have less patience (e.g.
Anderhub et al., 2001).
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Our discussion so far assumes that – as is typically implied in
engineering-economic models – EET and non-EET are perfect
substitutes, providing identical services to the adopter (e.g. iden-
tical quality, comfort, etc.). Some barrier taxonomies also include
“hidden costs” as a barrier (e.g. Sorrell et al., 2004), arguing that
these additional costs of EET adoption are hidden to the observer,
but not to the decision maker. Thus, hidden costs (or beneﬁts) may
not be adequately quantiﬁed in engineering-economic investment
appraisals. In essence, hidden costs reﬂect errors in the measure-
ment of costs and beneﬁts. Examples include perceived inferior
lighting quality of compact ﬂuorescent light bulbs compared to
incandescent bulbs, or cavity wall insulation causing damp. By the
same token, adopting EET may generate hidden beneﬁts, such as
with LED light ﬁxtures, which can more effectively improve air
sealing for recessed lighting due to their proper-sealing feature.
Likewise, double or triple glazed windows not only reduce heating
needs in the winter and cooling needs in the summer, but may
also lower noise transmission. Thus, unless properly accounted for,
these hidden costs (or beneﬁts) may bias the IDR upward or
downward.12
2.4. Covariates of underlying factors of the IDR
The IDRs implemented in energy models to govern household
investment decisions are based on the scant empirical literature,
which estimates IDRs based on observed technology choices (e.g.
Hausman, 1979). In particular, the IDRs implemented typically do
not vary by household type or technology. For example, PRIMES,
the leading model employed by the European Commission for EU
energy policy assessment, uses a ﬁxed subjective discount rate of
17.5% for all technology choices made by a representative house-
hold (European Commission, 2014).
It is intuitively clear that IDRs should be adjusted to account for
household or technology differences. However, such adjustments
are not straightforward, because household or technology char-
acteristics may affect different underlying factors of the IDR dif-
ferently. Analyzing how the underlying factors of the IDR (rather
than the aggregate IDR) vary with household or technology char-
acteristics allows for a better understanding of the observed var-
iations in the IDR, and is expected to offer additional insights for
modeling investment behavior in energy models. To illustrate this
point, we summarize the literature on some of the most com-
monly used household and technology characteristics.
2.4.1. Household characteristics
The impact of income on IDR is often discussed. Hausman
(1979) and Train (1985) argue that IDRs vary inversely with in-
come, thus suggesting heterogeneity across households by income.
The empirical literature typically ﬁnds that richer households have
more patience (e.g. Newell and Siikamäki, 2015; Tanaka et al.,
2010) and are unlikely to be highly risk-averse (Binswanger, 1980,
1981; Tanaka et al., 2010; Wik et al., 2004). Richer households also
tend to be associated with stronger pro-environmental pre-
ferences (e.g. Franzen, 2003; Torgler and García-Valiñas, 2007) and
adoption of EETs (e.g. Michelsen and Madlener, 2012; Mills and
Schleich, 2010a, 2014; Ramos et al., 2015). Thus, observing an in-
verse relationship between the IDR may not be meaningful since it
may stem from richer households being more patient, less risk-
averse or exhibiting stronger pro-environmental preferences, for
example. A qualitatively similar argument can be made for other12 Accounting for “hidden costs” and heterogeneity across users (see Section
2.4) may explain a substantial part of the “energy efﬁciency paradox” (e.g. Sorrell
et al., 2004; Gillingham et al., 2009).household covariates like education, age, or gender.
2.4.2. Technology characteristics
In addition to household characteristics, IDRs are also likely to
vary by technology characteristics. Poortinga et al. (2003) stress
that individual preferences generally differ by technology type.
Weber et al. (2002) suggest that individual risk attitudes vary by
context. To illustrate, we consider two aspects of technology: no-
velty and stakes.
As discussed in Section 2.3, uncertainty about the costs and
beneﬁts of EETs may be an external barrier to energy efﬁciency for
novel technologies (see also Hassett and Metcalf, 1993; Van Soest
and Bulte, 2001). In addition, for irreversible investments like in-
sulation measures, there is an option value associated with post-
poning adoption (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Mcdonald and Siegel,
1986). Thus, risk-aversion should be negatively correlated with the
adoption of novel and irreversible EETs, in particular (e.g. Farsi,
2010). In addition, the behavioral economics literature suggests
that risk and time preferences differ by stakes: risk aversion tends
to increase when stakes are higher (Binswanger, 1981; Holt and
Laury, 2002), as does patience (Frederick et al., 2002). This litera-
ture therefore suggests that the degree of novelty and the ﬁnancial
stakes of the technology will affect different underlying factors of
the IDR differently; understanding these effects will allow for
better model adoption in energy models.
Aside from household and technology characteristics, the IDR is
also related to policies. The relationship between policy inter-
ventions and the IDR will be explored in depth in the subsequent
section.3. Interplay of implicit discount rate and policy interventions
Since energy models are typically employed in energy policy
assessment, adequately capturing and interpreting the effects of
policies on the IDR is crucial. Effective energy efﬁciency policies
can be designed which lower the IDR. We distinguish between two
types of interventions. First, directed policy interventions address
the factors of the IDR that can be changed, that is, the external
barriers to energy efﬁciency. Second, reactive policy interventions
take into account the factors of the IDR that either cannot be
changed or are difﬁcult to change, that is preferences, bounded
rationality, rational inattention and behavioral biases. This pre-
sumption follows from economics, which supposes that pre-
ferences are innate and cannot be affected by policy interventions.
In contrast, psychology and consumer behavior theory treat pre-
ferences as malleable. Fig. 2 illustrates the interplay of policies and
the IDR providing illustrative, yet typical policies addressing each
underlying factor.
3.1. Directed policy interventions
Our subsequent discussion focuses on exemplary directed
policy interventions which are typically in place in the EU and
other industrialized countries (e.g. ODYSSEE-MURE, 2015).
In this section, we ﬁrst discuss two examples of policies di-
rected towards speciﬁc underlying factors of the IDR, before dis-
cussing more generally the implications of directed policy inter-
ventions for energy models and policy evaluation.
3.1.1. Financial support
In particular, rebates, tax incentives, soft loans and low-interest
credit may help overcome capital market constraints. Rebates have
been particularly effective for household appliances (e.g. Datta and
Filippini, 2016; Datta and Gulati, 2014; Davis et al., 2014; Galarraga
et al., 2016, 2013; Houde and Aldy, 2014; Revelt and Train, 1998).
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Fig. 2. : Interplay of policy interventions and the implicit discount rate.
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ments in energy-efﬁcient heating systems or thermal insulation
(e.g. Bullier and Milin, 2013; Guertler et al., 2013).
3.1.2. Provision of information
Energy labeling systems, such as the US Energy Star or the EU
labeling scheme, are typically designed to make consumers aware
of the relative energy-efﬁciency of appliances and associated po-
tential cost savings through the provision of observable, uniform,
and credible standards (e.g. Truffer et al., 2001). In this sense,
energy labeling schemes are often considered to be a cost-effective
measure to overcome external barriers related to lack of in-
formation and other transaction costs (Howarth et al., 2000; Su-
therland, 1991). Evaluation studies typically ﬁnd that the existing
energy labeling programs for household appliances are effective in
terms of energy and carbon reductions (e.g. Banerjee and Solomon,
2003; Bertoldi, 1999; Houde and Aldy, 2014; Sanchez et al., 2008).
Similarly, building performance certiﬁcates have been shown to
effectively reduce the lack of information and split-incentive bar-
riers, with energy-labeled dwellings achieving higher rents or
higher sale prices (Brounen et al., 2013; Fuerst et al., 2013). Finally,
(subsidized) energy audits are also expected to help overcome
information-related barriers to energy efﬁciency. Most empirical
ﬁndings conﬁrm that such audits are effective (Hirst et al., 1981;
Frondel et al., 2013; Alberini and Towe, 2015).
3.1.3. Implications for energy models and policy evaluation
When assessing the impacts of directed policy interventions,
modelers need to know the effect of a particular policy on themagnitude of the IDR, thereby taking into account that the ex-
ternal barriers and hence policy effectiveness may vary with in-
dividual characteristics. For example, capital market imperfections
are less prone to affect investment decisions of high-income
compared to low-income households. Thus, high income-house-
holds are less likely to respond to policy interventions addressing
lack of capital. Similarly, highly educated households are less
prone to lack of information, since higher education is expected to
reduce the costs of information acquisition and improve in-
formation processing (Schultz et al., 1975). From this perspective,
highly educated households would be less likely to change EET
adoption behavior in response to information campaigns, for ex-
ample. Finally, the ﬁnancial risks of an EET investment may be
higher for older people. The risk of not living long enough to re-
cuperate the high upfront costs associated with lower energy costs
in the long run increases with age. In addition, policy effectiveness
differs across individuals because individuals differ in terms of
preferences and predictable (ir)rational behavior. This point will
be elaborated on in the subsequent sub-section.
Clearly, a particular policy intervention may be employed to
address various external barriers and other underlying factors of
the IDR. In addition, since a single policy intervention may typi-
cally not be effective in addressing multiple barriers, multiple
policy interventions will be required (e.g. Jochem and Gruber,
1990). There may also be interaction effects between policy in-
terventions, i.e. policies may weaken or strengthen the effective-
ness of other policies. For example, Newell et al. (1999) found that
energy taxes will be more effective when applied together with
other policies such as performance standards or labeling.
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Akin to the discussion of directed policy interventions, space
constraints limit our discussion to exemplary reactive policy in-
terventions. Similarly, we ﬁrst present here two examples of re-
active policies that take into account speciﬁc underlying factors of
the IDR, before discussing more generally the implications of re-
active policy interventions for energy models and policy
evaluation.
3.2.1. Minimum energy performance standards
Minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) are com-
mand-and-control type policies that remove the worst performing
appliances from the markets. Thus, by limiting technology avail-
ability, MEPS address, in particular, bounded rationality and ra-
tional inattention. Most prominently, in the EU and other coun-
tries, MEPS have resulted in a gradual phase-out of non-directional
incandescent light (IL) bulbs. Mills and Schleich (2014) ﬁnd that
the EU ban on ILs was effective in accelerating the transitions from
ILs to more energy efﬁcient CFL and LED bulbs.
3.2.2. Nudging
So called nudging policies have lately become fashionable in
various policy domains, including energy efﬁciency policy. Nud-
ging policies are non-coercive, paternalistic interventions, which
attempt to change behavior (here: increase the adoption of EET) by
manipulating the framing of a decision problem. Thus, nudging
policies take into account behavioral biases and preferences, yet
they do not attempt to change them. Nudging policies generally
include feedback, goal setting, normative messages or default
setting (e.g. Croson and Treich, 2014; Abrahamse et al., 2005,
2009; McCalley and Midden, 2002; Schultz et al., 2007). Feedback
on electricity use is typically transmitted via monthly or yearly
energy bills or via modern information and communication tech-
nologies in combination with smart metering. Providing house-
holds with information on their electricity consumption has gen-
erally been found to be effective (e.g. Wilhite and Ling, 1995;
Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010; Gleerup et al., 2010; Gans et al.,
2012; Schleich et al., 2013). Abrahamse et al. (2005) conclude that
in general, feedback is particularly effective when it is combined
with information on energy-efﬁcient measures. In her review of
ﬁeld studies, Fischer (2008) concludes that the effectiveness of
feedback on household electricity consumption depends on fre-
quency (ideally real-time energy use), the level of disaggregation
(ideally appliance-speciﬁc breakdown), duration (the longer the
better), and the presentation of the information (understandable,
appealing design). But the effects of feedback may be transitory
only (Allcott, 2011), and may backﬁre for households with below-
average usage (Allcott, 2011), in particular, if households are po-
litically conservative (Costa and Kahn, 2013; Gromet et al., 2013).
Default setting “exploits” reference dependency of preferences and
has been shown to work well in other areas (outside of EET
adoption), including online purchases or activations, with a pre-
checked option that requires a consumer to actively uncheck the
option (e.g. Carroll et al., 2009; Madrian and Shea, 2001). However,
there are only few known applications of default settings to en-
ergy efﬁciency. Notably, a ﬁeld experiment by Brown et al. (2013)
implies that ofﬁce workers respond to defaults settings for ther-
mostats. Finally, providing information via labeling tackles boun-
ded rationality and rational inattention on the part of technology
purchasers, and may also be classiﬁed as a nudging strategy (e.g.
Newell and Siikamäki, 2013).
3.2.3. Implications for energy models and policy making
As was the case for directed policy interventions, modelers also
need to know the change in the IDR in response to the reactivepolicy interventions. By deﬁnition, evaluations of reactive policy
interventions must take into account differences in preferences or
predictable (ir)rational behavior across individuals. For example,
tax incentive programs that anticipate tax reductions in the dis-
tant future (e.g. over several years) are more appealing to patient
investors (with a lower time discount rate). A similar argument
holds for investment subsidies, which are often spread out over
several years. In comparison, less patient and more risk-averse
investors are expected to favor contracting schemes since these
schemes do not require initial outlays and allow for rather stable
payments over time. Similarly, risk-averse investors are expected
to be more likely to participate in soft loan programs involving
ﬁxed rather than variable interest rates, or respond to warranty
schemes. However, if individuals exhibit an intrinsic aversion to-
wards debt, soft loans might prove ineffective. Providing in-
formation on environmental performance will render EETs more
attractive for individuals with particularly strong pro-environ-
mental preferences. Likewise, the effectiveness of command-and-
control type regulation may vary with the strength of individuals’
pro-environmental preferences. Following Frey and Stutzer (2008),
this type of policy intervention may lower the self-determination
of individuals with strong pro-environmental preferences, thus
lowering the adoption of EETs. On the other hand, command-and-
control regulations signal social norms and may accelerate a
broader uptake of EET.
Reactive policy interventions may also be combined to amplify
effectiveness. In particular, providing information on energy use
together with goal setting, or normative messages about a
households’ electricity use compared to that of its neighbors, has
been shown to be particularly effective (Allcott, 2011; Ayres et al.,
2012; Schultz et al., 2007).4. Conclusion and policy implications
Implicit discount rates are key parameters in model-based
policy evaluations, since they are employed to govern decision
makers’ energy-efﬁciency technology choices in models. Empiri-
cally derived implicit discount rates vary substantially and typi-
cally exceed the opportunity costs of capital. By looking at the
factors underlying the implicit discount rate for household adop-
tion of EETs in a comprehensive way, we also derive insights for
policy making and modeling.
More speciﬁcally, by combining established concepts from
various disciplines our framework distinguishes three broad ca-
tegories of factors underlying the IDR: (i) preferences such as time
preferences, risk preferences, reference-dependent preferences,
and pro-environmental preferences; (ii) predictable (ir)rational
behavior such as bounded rationality, rational inattention, and
behavioral biases such as present bias, status quo bias or prob-
ability distortion; and (iii) external barriers to energy efﬁciency
such as the landlord-tenant problem, lack of information or lim-
ited access to capital. While the extant literature has extensively
explored external barriers to energy efﬁciency, the focus on be-
havioral factors and preferences offers promising insights for EET
adoption, which will merit further empirical research. In parti-
cular, we argue that loss aversion may factor into households’
adoption of EET to the extent that the (additional) costs of in-
vesting in EET are evaluated as a loss. In this case, loss-averse in-
dividuals may over-weight the associated losses and prefer not to
adopt otherwise proﬁtable EETs. Likewise, in addition to risk
preferences, preferences over ambiguity may affect individuals’
adoption of novel EETs, since objective probabilities of costs and
beneﬁts of these technologies are typically not available. More-
over, households may be prudent, when deciding on adopting an
EET. To avoid downside risk, prudent households may shy away
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from investing in capital-intensive insulation measures, for ex-
ample, because they are reluctant to take out an economically
advantageous loan to ﬁnance the investment. We argue that loss
aversion, ambiguity preferences, prudence and debt-aversion
likely result in higher IDRs. Future work could extend the analysis
of these factors from laboratory experiments (typically with uni-
versity students) to representative, country-speciﬁed samples, and
thus provide more realistic and robust ﬁndings for policy making.
For example, debt-averse households would likely not respond to
soft loans, which are a frequently used policy to accelerate the
adoption of retroﬁt measures in many countries.
Our framework more generally allows for a fresh look at the
interplay of IDRs and policies, thereby distinguishing between
directed and reactive policy interventions. Directed policies aim to
lower the IDR by adequately targeting the external barriers to
energy efﬁciency, i.e. the factors that are external to the decision
maker. In comparison, the design of reactive policies takes into
account preferences and predictable (ir)rational behaviors. A key
challenge for interpretation of the IDR and for policy design is to
identify separately the individual factors underlying the IDR, e.g.
isolate the contribution of time preferences from risk preferences
(and their possible interaction), or rational inattention from
bounded rationality. For example, raising energy taxes is expected
to address rational inattention because higher taxes increase the
costs of inattention (e.g. Alcott and Wozny, 2014). However, raising
energy taxes is unlikely to address bounded rationality. Thus, if the
objective of an energy tax increase was to spur adoption of EETs,
but the factor impeding adoption was bounded rationality rather
than rational inattention, raising energy taxes would be in-
effective. By the same token, observing high IDRs does not provide
guidance for policy making, since the underlying source cannot be
identiﬁed (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). Representing decision-makers’
actual choices in a given context, IDRs exhibit a high external va-
lidity. The internal validity of IDRs, however, is low, since the eli-
citation method does not allow to adequately measuring decision
makers’ preferences with control over other factors. Thus, the IDRs
are rather poor starting points for policy interventions. Our review
of the empirical literature reports how the individual factors un-
derlying the IDR correlate with household and technology char-
acteristics, and thus contribute to a better understanding of the
IDRs used in energy models. For example, observed correlations of
the IDR with socio-economic characteristics such as income, pro-
vide only limited insights since the nature of the correlation can-
not be identiﬁed. In this case, a negative correlation between in-
come and the magnitude of the IDR may be observed because ri-
cher households are less likely to face credit constraints, or are less
risk-averse, or are more patient, or exhibit stronger pro-environ-
mental preferences. Put differently, observing that low income
households are associated with a high IDR provides little in-
formation on the type of policy intervention that may be called for.
In terms of modeling household adoption behavior via IDRs,
our ﬁndings also imply that IDRs should vary based on household
characteristics and technologies. For instance, new technologies or
technologies with high investment costs should be associated with
a higher IDR, ceteris paribus. This contrasts sharply with conven-
tional model speciﬁcations, which do not differentiate IDRs by
household types or technology. Failure to account for hetero-
geneity in the IDR and also for household responses to policy in-
terventions likely biases model-based evaluations of policy effec-
tiveness. Gerarden et al. (2015b) argue that this shortcoming leads
to overestimating the magnitude of the energy efﬁciency paradox.
In the same way, it helps explain why energy-engineering analyses
tend to overstate the proﬁtable energy efﬁciency potential com-
pared to ex-post estimates (Davis et al., 2014). Thus, additional
representative empirical analyses based on households’ observedor stated adoption behavior may supply modelers with more
realistic IDRs. Similarly, ﬁeld experiments or representative stated
choice experiments may provide insights into household-speciﬁc
responses to policy interventions. In particular, one of the objec-
tives of empirical studies could be to prioritize the factors to de-
termine which may have the greatest effect on the IDR and should
therefore explicitly be included in the models.Role of funding source
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